For, and Against, an Elected GG

In light of my brief post calling for an elected governor general, Catelli over at Not Quite Unhinged asked if I’d be interested in expanding on my idea in the context of a debate with ‘Sir Francis’ of Dred Tory. Never one to shy from a debate, I agreed; the first round is now up: Catelli’s introduction; my opening in support of an elected GG; and Sir Francis’s opening in support of an appointed GG. Rebuttals will go up next week.

At the close of the debate I’ll re-post my material here, but for now please head on over to Catelli’s and check it out.

Want to Re-Empower Parliament?

Return executive power to the Governor General, and elect her.

Free Tibet?

Maybe not:

President Barack Obama has refused to meet the Dalai Lama in Washington this week in a move to curry favour with the Chinese. The decision came after China stepped up a campaign urging nations to shun the Tibetan spiritual leader. It means Mr Obama will become the first president not to welcome the Nobel peace prize winner to the White House since the Dalai Lama began visiting Washington in 1991.

Sophie Richardson, Asia advocate for Human Rights Watch, said: “Presidents always meets the Dalai Lama and what happens? Absolutely nothing. This idea that if you are nice to the Chinese Communist Party up front you can cash in later is just wrong. If you lower the bar on human rights they will just move it lower and lower.”

Honduras Round-Up

I’ve been traveling for the better part of a month, and I haven’t been able to stay on top of the developments in Honduras. Here’s a brief round-up:

  • The Law Library of Congress’s Directorate of Legal Research has issued what is, to date, the only objective legal analysis of the Honduran constitutional crisis. Its conclusion?

    Available sources indicate that the judicial and legislative branches applied constitutional and statutory law in the case against President Zelaya in a manner that was judged by the Honduran authorities from both branches of the government to be in accordance with the Honduran legal system.

    In other words: it wasn’t a coup. The report proceeds through a series of questions: [1] Does the Honduran constitution empower the Congress and / or the judiciary to remove a president? (Yes); [2] Did the Honduran Supreme Court have the legal authority to hear a case against the president? (Yes); [3] Did the Honduran Supreme Court have the legal authority to order the military to carry out an arrest warrant against the president? (Yes); [4] Did the Honduran Congress have legal authority to remove a president from office? (Yes); [5] Was Zelaya removed from office in accordance with these legal rules? (Yes).

    The crux of the report, at least with regard to Zelaya’s actual removal from office, is that the Honduran Constitution empowers the Congress to “approve or disapprove” executive conduct, and that the Congress had the authority to interpret the word “disapprove” to include the power of removal. That’s a controversial interpretation, to be sure; but as the report notes, the Constitution vests Congress with that interpretative power. There will inevitably be many outside of Honduras, and not a few within, who will claim that the interpretation was flawed. But the Honduran Constitution clearly empowers Congress to make the judgment call it made. Imposing any other interpretation clearly undermines the rule of law.

    Finally, the report notes that Zelaya’s forcible removal from Honduras likely violated the Constitution, which provides that “[n]o Honduran may be expatriated nor handed over to the authorities of a foreign State.” But as I’ve noted elsewhere, the fact that Zelaya’s removal from Honduras was illegal does not mean that Zelaya’s removal from office was illegal. It wasn’t.

  • In the wake of the Law Library of Congress report, opinions may finally be shifting. Writing in The New Republic—a traditionally liberal magazine—James Kirchick notes that “the report paints Zelaya’s removal as remarkably orderly and legalistic, especially in a region where the rule of law is so tenuous.” As he notes, this leaves the Obama administration (which has steadily escalated its condemnation of the removal and its demands for Zelaya’s return to office) “squarely contradicted by the only known official analysis of the constitutional issues involved.” Kirchick offers an interesting explanation for the administration’s stubbornness:

    The day after Zelaya was put on a plane to Costa Rica, Obama condemned the move as illegal, saying that “it would be a terrible precedent if we start moving backwards into the era in which we are seeing military coups as a means of political transition rather than democratic elections. We don’t want to go back to a dark past.” His invocation of U.S. support for armed opposition movements fighting communist insurgencies in Latin America during the Cold War is one of numerous apologies for past American actions that he has offered since taking office, a tactic which seems to be a core tenant of his diplomatic strategy.

    That may or may not be Obama’s motivation; but in any case, as Kirchick rights, it seems clearer by the day that “U.S. policy has become a mistake in search of a rationale.”

  • The latest manifestation of that mistake is the American threat not to recognize the outcome of the upcoming presidential election—notwithstanding the fact that the election is a contest between candidates chosen while Zelaya was in office and administered by an electoral commission similarly assembled before Zelaya’s ouster. In short, the Obama administration has decided to use Honduran democracy as a bargaining chip in order to achieve Zelaya’s return to office. Kirchick notes the absurdity and hypocrisy of this position:

    How does this administration justify its recognition of results of elections in Pakistan, Iraq, and other countries mired in constitutional disputes, but now refuse to recognize an election in Honduras, even if it is conducted in a free and fair manner? And why give greater diplomatic dignity to the representatives of Iran–who have no legitimacy whatsoever–and not those of democratic Honduras?

    Writing in Foreign Policy magazine, Kevin Casas-Zamora makes a similar point:

    However imperfect, the election still offers the best route to restore some kind of normality in Honduras, so that the country’s democratic breakdown is not complete. . . . Without a doubt, semi-authoritarian thugs like Hugo Chávez and Daniel Ortega will cry foul no matter the election result since their man in Tegucigalpa never returned to power. But for serious countries such as the United States and Brazil — countries that wound up accepting the results of the recent election in Iran — turning the winner of a free and fair election in Honduras into a pariah would not just be an act of immense hypocrisy but also of foolishness. It is a surefire way to prolong this crisis indefinitely into the future. The price of this would be paid, as usual, by the poorest of the poor in Honduras.

    He concludes: “Unless evidence emerges that the current authorities in Honduras are engaging in systematic harassment against opposition leaders or the press, evidence of which so far has been scant, there is no reason to deny diplomatic recognition to the winner of November’s poll.”

  • Michael Totten, writing in Commentary magazine, echoes this point:

    Either way, whether the ousted president returns or he doesn’t, a new election is scheduled to take place in November, and a new government will be sworn in next January. The crisis will then be over no matter what else happens between now and then. This may not be the preferred solution for the Obama administration and the Organization of American States, but it will solve the problem. Both Zelaya and the controversial interim government will be history. The only reason Honduras should be isolated or sanctioned after November is if the election is stolen or canceled.

    Indeed. How has such a simple proposition become so controversial? And what madness has seized the Obama administration that they are willing to write off the results of even a free and fair democratic election in order to rationalize a hasty and ill-considered initial stance?

  • And what of the man Obama would make President of Honduras again? The Miami Herald reports:

    It’s been 89 days since Manuel Zelaya was booted from power. He’s sleeping on chairs, and he claims his throat is sore from toxic gases and “Israeli mercenaries” are torturing him with high-frequency radiation.

    Ah. So either [1] Israeli mercenaries are torturing Zelaya with high-frequency radiation; or [2] Zelaya is a paranoid delusional; or [3] Zelaya is not delusional, but there are no Israeli mercenaries, and Obama’s preferred president is knowingly stoking anti-Semetic sentiment. (Not anti-Semetic? Then why “Israeli” mercenaries?)

The global endorsement of Manuel Zelaya following his ouster was hasty and ill-considered back in June. In October it has become a farce. Will the United States really betray the cause of democracy and the rule of law in Honduras? And if it does, will Canada play along?

Moving Forward in Honduras

Following ousted President Emanuel Zelaya’s surreptitious return to Honduras, interim Honduran President Roberto Micheletti has another important op/ed in the Washington Post. Micheletti makes a fundamental point that has been almost completely missed in both coverage and analysis of the Honduran crisis:

Underlying all the rhetoric about a military overthrow are facts. Simply put, coups do not leave civilians in control over the armed forces, as is the case in Honduras today. Neither do they allow the independent functioning of democratic institutions — the courts, the attorney general’s office, the electoral tribunal. Nor do they maintain a respect for the separation of powers. In Honduras, the judicial, legislative and executive branches are all fully functioning and led by civilian authorities.

Most importantly, as Micheletti notes, coups do not allow for regularly scheduled elections — and yet a presidential election is scheduled to go ahead in early November, and there has been no suggestion that the army, or the interim government, or anyone except Zelaya intends to interfere with that election:

The election is being convened by an autonomous body, the Supreme Electoral Tribunal, whose magistrates were selected by Congress in early 2009 and ratified by then-President Zelaya. The autonomous body began the electoral process with presidential primary elections — which were supervised by the Organization of American States — in 2008 also during Zelaya’s tenure.

The next six weeks will determine not only the political future of Honduras, but the commitment of the international community to democracy and the rule of law.

Remember

It’s September 11. When it happened, I was sure the date would be marked and observed every year. Certainly it still resonates; and I’m sure there are ceremonies in New York today. I’m in Scotland, though, and largely disconnected from the day-to-day. So this is my ceremony.

Harper on Honduras

At the Three Amigos conference in Guadalajara, Stephen Harper gave Jake Tapper of ABC News a broad-ranging interview that touched on trade, health-care, H1N1, and Afghanistan. The interview also contained the first reported public statements by Harper on Honduras (at least that I’ve seen); I reproduce them here in full:

Tapper: There has been some criticism about the United States for not doing enough in Honduras to return President Zelaya. Do you have thoughts on that?

Harper: Well, as I said in our press conference here, I find this quite hypocritical. I would be quite—if I were an American I would be quite annoyed by that kind of question because the United States has been accused of—so regularly in my lifetime, particularly in our hemisphere – of meddling and interfering in the affairs of others.

Now we have a problem in Honduras and we have some people jumping up and demanding the United States intervene and meddle.

I think the approach taken by the American administration is the correct one. First of all, they’ve articulated the same values that Canada, Mexico and others have articulated and that is we need to see democracy and the rule of law restored in Honduras.

As you know, there’s two sides to that issue. The democratically elected government should be restored and that government should be committed to respecting the constitutional rules of that country.

I think we all agree with that. President Arias of Costa Rica with the Organization of the American States is leading mediated efforts. Canada and Mexico are directly involved in that mediation effort. We have been highly supported by the Untied States in the mediation effort.

The United States views are not secret. It has been pushing to see the same outcomes we’re trying to see and I think this is the appropriate approach for the United States is to be very forceful and very helpful and to work with others to make sure democratic norms are upheld in our hemisphere.

Harper’s seemingly unequivocal support for the American position is disappointing but predictable. But there’s enough equivocation between the lines to make me suspect that the Canadian delegation is having a significant positive impact on the negotiations. Harper makes two basic points: (1) don’t meddle—which means, don’t try to impose a solution from the outside (namely the restoration of Zelaya), but instead help Hondurans to achieve an internally negotiated settlement; and (2) the goal is the restoration of constitutional democracy—a principle that Zelaya violated at least as much as the army. I suspect that’s what Harper’s hinting at when he says “there’s two sides to that issue;” at least, I can’t think of another, better, plausible explanation for that statement.

In short, while the Canadian government’s initial response to the Zelaya ouster was hasty and ill-considered, it seems as though the government has moved towards a much more balanced and appropriate position, and there is reason to believe—or at least hope—that it is using its position as a (dare I say) honest broker to shape negotiations over the future of Honduras. That strikes me as a good thing.

Debating Honduras at The Mark

Over at The Mark, they’ve put together a nifty little feature that collects my writings defending the Honduran interim government as well as the critical position taken by Dalhousie Professor Robert Huish.  (Huish’s sur-response is scheduled to be published next Friday.)  Take a look here.

This is designed to become a regular feature at The Mark—presenting conflicting positions side-by-side so that a reader can follow the debate.  I think it’s a great idea, and I look forward to seeing it develop.  I’d be interested to hear what readers think of the format.

Re-evaluating Honduras

[An edited version of this post appears at The Mark.]

It’s been a month since the Honduran army, at the direction of the Supreme Court, removed President Manuel Zelaya from office, and a month since—on its own initiative—the army sent Zelaya into exile. A month of demonstrations and failed negotiations have not changed the status quo: the interim government of President Roberto Micheletti remains in power, isolated from its central American neighbors and ostracized on the world stage; and Zelaya remains determined to resume office, unrepentant of his illegal activity and encouraged by the support of world leaders from Obama to Chavez.

My June 30 article expressing support for Zelaya’s ouster has recently come in for criticism, with Dalhousie’s Prof. Robert Huish accusing me of (in essence) ignoring military brutality and the best interests of the Honduran people by supporting a conservative army coup. Though Prof. Huish makes a powerful emotional case, I stand by my position. Let me explain why.

Huish paints a disturbing picture of the state of affairs in Honduras. “[T]anks, tear gas, death threats, hired assassins, and soldiers keen to beat the poor to a pulp” have left the Honduran people “bleed[ing] in the streets,” he tells us. Those who protest are “sent . . . to early graves.” No right-thinking person could support such a brutal, repressive military regime, he suggests—and he’s right. If Honduras really were like that, I’d be the first to condemn the regime.

But Huish cites no specific source for his allegations, and reports from reputable human rights organizations paint a very different picture—one that is troubling enough without embellishment or exaggeration. Both Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch have identified acts of intimidation by the Honduran military, including the arrest of pro-Zelaya demonstrators and the obstruction of certain media outlets. And, of course, the military appears to have been responsible for the tragic and unnecessary death of Isi Obed Murillo, a fifteen-year-old boy shot during a pro-Zelaya protest at the Tegucigalpa airport on July 5. These repressive tactics are deplorable, and supporters of Honduran democracy should be the first to demand investigation and accountability.

Yet these documented military excesses and abuses, deplorable though they are, do not turn Honduras into the police state Huish describes. The restrictions on Honduran liberty imposed since Zelaya’s removal—the curfews, travel restrictions, and media controls—are all related to the current crisis; they are not designed to install a military government. I want to make clear that I think the measures are unwise and unnecessary. But it is important to remember that Zelaya has called for a mutiny in the army ranks, and that Hugo Chavez has repeatedly threatened invasion. Pierre Trudeau suspended civil liberties and rolled in the tanks in far less pressing circumstances during the October Crisis of 1970; and while that decision was (and remains) deeply controversial, it did not turn Canada into a military dictatorship.

So it is in Honduras. The military may well be operating with an unnecessarily heavy fist, and to the degree that it is, it is to be condemned. But the military has not overthrown the civilian government. Elections are expected to take place on schedule this fall, and I have seen no reports of army interference with that democratic process. In fact, interim President Micheletti has repeatedly indicated the government’s willingness to advance the date of elections so that Hondurans can choose a new government untainted by the Zelaya ouster; but Zelaya has rejected the compromise because it will not return him to office. The point is that whether elections happen now or in the fall, they will happen; and I will gladly join Prof. Huish in calling on the new government to investigate the military’s conduct during the crisis and to punish unnecessary excesses.

Yet that does not seem to satisfy Prof. Huish, who admits that he’d just as soon see the Honduran constitution swept aside—provided it is Zelaya who does the sweeping. “Honduras’s constitution has let down its nobodies,” he writes, those who are “too poor to see the doctor, too marginalized to go to school, and many [of whom] are doomed to die before the age of five because of dirty water, closed up hospitals, and preventable diseases.” Huish may well be right; I don’t pretend to be an expert on Honduran domestic politics. And as a political platform, his call for social justice has great appeal. But Huish seems to argue that the existence of social inequalities delegitimizes the entire existing constitutional order and (therefore) justifies Zelaya’s conduct in attempting an illegal constitutional change.

I disagree. The extent to which positive social rights should be constitutionally and legally protected is an age-old question in the democratic world. Different societies have come to different conclusions at different times, and the debate rages on—consider, for instance, our American neighbours’ current debate over health care. A country should be free to choose where on that continuum it falls at any given time, and that choice should take place at the ballot. As long, therefore, as all members of society have the right to participate in elections, we outside observers should respect—and support—the underlying constitutional order.

That doesn’t mean we should be content with the political status quo. It may be, as Prof. Huish suggests, that poor Hondurans face practical obstacles to voting; if that’s so, then I certainly would support efforts to remove those obstacles by, for instance, providing public transportation to polling stations and ensuring that citizens are not punished by employers for taking time off to vote. But it is dangerous to suggest, as Huish seems to suggest, that a failure to pass certain social policies delegitimizes a constitutional government. If that were so, then every election would become a civil war, as every losing party would claim an entitlement to overthrow the constitution in order to enact its own preferred policies. Democracy cannot survive in such conditions.

We need not be content with the politics of the Honduran government; but we must be content with the rule of law. By all means, let us agitate for policy changes that expand social rights; but let us do so in the context of elections. The alternative—rejection of the constitutional order and imposition of certain policies by strong-arm and fiat—is lawlessness. It puts power in the hands of the strongest, or the meanest, or the least compromising. It encourages violence and retribution. And it is, after all, how we got here in the first place.

The Path Forward

Honduras’s interim president, Roberto Micheletti, has an important op-ed in today’s Wall Street Journal reiterating some key—but oft-overlooked—facts about Manuel Zelaya’s removal from office, and explaining the Honduran government’s willingness to accept a negotiated settlement to the crisis.