Mader Blog

Warren Kinsella has a (mostly) thoughtful post about the consequences of negotiating with al Qaida to achieve the release of Bob Fowler and Louis Guay. The prime minister was very careful with his words yesterday, acknowledging that negotiation was the best option in the circumstances but maintaining that Canada neither pays ransoms to, nor exchanges prisoners with, any terrorist group. As Warren notes, that leaves open—and points to—the possibility that an intermediary like Mali or Burkina Faso did pay a ransom or exchange prisoners to achieve the diplomats’ release.

I don’t know how to draw the line. I am inclined to the strong position that Canada should never negotiate with these groups, even if that means consigning hostages to their fate. But of course that abstract position bumps up against its human and personal cost, particularly for a DFAIT brat like me. Still, while the nation is grateful today for the safe return of our public servants, I think it’s important to acknowledge the consequence of what has occurred.

Let us assume that some concession was made to this al Qaida franchise to achieve the diplomats’ return. The consequence, inevitably, will be an increase in the incentive to kidnap western officials in the region. The consequence of that will, I predict, be a decrease in the willingness to western officials to travel to the region. It’s important to recall that Fowler and Guay were in Niger on behalf of the United Nations. Insofar as U.N. and western officials become less willing to visit the region, the result will be a decrease in the good that those officials could otherwise do. And the cost of negotiation, therefore, will be the loss of the benefits that our officials could have brought to the region, directly or indirectly, through their active involvement in local humanitarian and good-governance efforts. That cost won’t be borne by you or me; it will be born by the folks in Niger.

Of course, at root this is a result of the kidnapping itself: I suspect you’ll find fewer volunteers at DFAIT willing to go to Niger today that you’d have found a year ago. In other words, the ultimate responsibility for the hindrance of western aid efforts—and the resulting cost to the local population—rests on the shoulders of the terrorists. But if negotiating with terrorists increases, even incrementally, their motivation to take more hostages, then we bear the responsibility for the resulting incremental decrease in the good that is done in the region.

Perhaps that’s a price we’re willing to pay—particularly because we derive the benefit without having to bear the cost. But it’s worth sparing a thought, at least, for those on whom that burden falls.