Mader Blog

O'Malley on Child Soldiers

Maclean's' Kady O'Malley has been a particularly vocal critic of Canada's official approach to the Khadr case, and today she cited the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflicts in support of her argument.

I posted a comment to her blog post, but it appears not to have made it through, so I'll repeat my comment here: what does the Optional Protocol have to do with Khadr? The Protocol enjoins ratifying states from recruiting or deploying children for or in combat. But Canada didn't recruit or deploy Khadr; nor did the United States. If anyone has violated the Protocol, it's the Taliban, or whatever sect Khadr was fighting for when he allegedly killed the American soldier. (Though I have a sneaking suspicion they aren't signatories to the - uh - Optional Protocol.)

As I said at ITQ, if we're so determined to get our collective balls in a knot over Khadr, shouldn't we be expressing our anger towards those who actually recruited and deployed him, rather than at those who, had he been within their power, would have prevented him from engaging in combat?

So pace Ms O'Malley and Sen. Dallaire, I don't see what the Optional Protocol contributes to their argument that Khadr shouldn't stand trial for his actions. No, Khadr shouldn't have been in combat in the first place - but that's the fault of the Taliban or whomever, not the fault of Canada or the United States. And once he was in combat, nothing in the Optional Protocol says he can't be held accountable for his actions - taking into proper account, of course, the fact that he was a minor.

There's a lot of righteous anger about Khadr floating around the Canadian blogosphere; I'd very much like to see an articulated explanation of that anger.

What's Wrong with Trying Child Soldiers?

Some time ago on his excellent blog Kelly Nestruck voiced his opposition to the trial of Omar Khadr for war crimes. In the comments to Kelly's post, I raised a semantic question about one of Kelly's points; I subsequently forgot all about it - until Sen. Dallaire's recent comments reminded me of the exchange. I see that Kelly responded to my comment and asked why I wasn't taking a position on the underlying merits of the Khadr case.

There are two short answers to Kelly's question: first, I don't feel well-enough informed about Khadr's case to take a position; and second, taking a position on the merits would require me to take a position on matters of American law, which I'm precluded from doing in my current job.

But I'm not precluded from taking a position on the more general issue raised by Kelly and Sen. Dallaire, namely whether child soldiers should be subject to trial for their combat actions. And my simple question to Kelly and others in the Dallaire camp is: why not?

The general argument against holding children liable for criminal activity is that children lack the mental capacity required to commit a crime. In traditional common law, crime was seen to have two main components: an act, and a culpable mental state. In other words, it wasn't enough to simply do a criminal act; you had to mean to do the act for liability to attach. Think of it this way: if you were chopping wood, and the ax flew out of your hands and killed your neighbor, you wouldn't be liable for his murder. But if you threw the ax at your neighbor and killed him, you would be - because in the latter instance you did the act while meaning to commit the crime.

The argument here is that children lack the mental capacity to commit crime - that because they are children, we cannot say that they truly meant to commit a crime when they performed the otherwise-criminal act. That seems to be the basis of the Dallaire position: child soldiers are children; children can't form the mental state necessary to commit crime; therefore child soldiers can't be liable for crimes.

But while Dallaire and company are correct that children are different when it comes to criminal law, they're wrong to suggest that children can never be criminally liable. Children are generally thought to lack mental capacity because they are simply too young to understand that their actions are criminal. But the development of mental capacity is a process, not an event; and even if it were an event, there's no reason to think that it would correspond directly to the child's eighteenth birthday. In other words, the closer a child gets to majority, the more likely it is that he or she will be able to comprehend the criminality of his or her act.

Many jurisdictions address this problem by applying a sliding scale of assumptions regarding the mental capacity of children. For instance, many jurisdictions hold children aged seven and under to be immune from criminal prosecution; impose a strong presumption against criminal liability for minors aged eight to fourteen, which can be rebutted by a showing that the individual defendant did in fact have the required mental state; and limit the punishment, but not the criminal liability, of children aged fifteen and older.

Of course the prosecution always bears the burden of proving that a defendant had the required mental state; this is as true for minors as it is for adults. And it follows that a defendant can always argue that he lacked the required mental state - because, for instance, he was brainwashed by his family and culture. Whether or not such an argument succeeds depends on the evaluation of the tendered evidence by the trier of fact in the case.

The point being, just because someone was a child when they committed a criminal act doesn't mean they can never have criminal liability. Sen. Dallaire frames his argument in legalistic language, so I put to him, and to Kelly, the question why this basic principle of criminal law should not apply as much to child soldiers as to other child criminals. A child criminal tried for war crimes should be treated differently than an adult tried for the same crimes, of course - given our presumptions regarding a child's mental capacity. But when a child is close to the age of majority, I don't see why that child shouldn't stand trial like any other child criminal, with the ability to refute the prosecution's argument that he had the mental state required to commit the crime charged.

I said I couldn't talk about matters of American law, and I won't; but there's another problem with Dallaire's argument that bears considering. Dallaire declares that the trial of a child soldier for war crimes is contrary to international law. But international law only has legal force in a jurisdiction if it has been adopted or ratified by that jurisdiction, either legislatively or judicially. I do not know, and make no claim regarding, whether or not the United States has adopted any international law prohibiting the trial of child soldiers for war crimes. I think it would be important to know. Because if the United States has not done so, then Sen. Dallaire's claim that Khadr's trial is "illegal" amounts to no more than Dallaire's belief that the United States should be bound by a code of laws it has not adopted.

And since we've entered the realm of asinine comparisons, I have to ask: doesn't that argument sound familiar?

Corner Gas: Genius, or Best Program on Canadian Television?

I'd say both, but I'm currently unable to watch Canadian television. I am able to watch Corner Gas though, nightly, and I do - because it's genius.

Speaking of Canadian Politics...

Keith Martin has an absolutely must-read op-ed in today's Post calling for a rethinking of our attitudes towards Parliament. From the piece:

First, MPs should be given more freedom to vote according to the interests of their constituents, rather than by party lines.... Second, dissension by an MP should not be seen by a party as an act of disloyalty or by the media as a failure of the party, or the party's leader.... Fifth, the executive power of the Prime Minister's Office over everything from MPs to the public service is greater in Canada than that possessed by any other Western leader. This could be changed by allowing MPs to select their leader from the ranks of their own which would force the prime minister to work more closely with his or her caucus.

Note especially Martin's call for the prime minister to be selected by MPs. Currently the selection of the PM is left, as a practical matter, to the whims of the party executives, since the PM is simply the internally-selected leader of the majority party in the Commons. Because leadership selection is a private party matter, implementing Martin's change would be relatively simple. It's unclear, though, whether Martin's proposal would have all MPs of all parties select the PM, or whether he merely means that the parties should select their leaders via a ballot of MPs (as is the practice of the British Conservative Party). The difference would arise in a minority Parliament, when the opposition parties might gather to select a prime minister of a party other than the one holding a plurality of seats.

In any case, these are all important ideas, and Martin is to be highly commended for trying to kick-start a rethinking of our approach to this most important of our democratic institutions.

I Haven't Been Blogging Much, Have I?

But I've been reading. I've been reading John Scalzi's Old Man's War and Ghost Brigades, and I'm waiting on The Last Colony in the mail. The first two are highly recommended; they're less politico-philosophical than Heinlein, but they better realize the science part of the sci-fi genre, and to his credit Scalzi does successfully explore various non-political philosophical concepts without resorting, per Heinlein, to setting chapters quite literally in lecture halls.

I've also been reading a lot about British politics. Political nerds in the Anglosphere have been focused on the American presidential election. As MaderBlog readers know, or may have guessed, my current job precludes me from blogging about American political matters; but even if I could, there wouldn't be much for me to say that isn't being said, at greater volume, pretty much everywhere else. [Incidentally, the restraint on my American political blogging will continue at least through the summer of 2009, although I should be free to live-blog the results of the election in November, without partisan political comment.]

So American politics is out, and Canadian politics is, well, boring. It's not that nothing's happening; lots is happening, on a macro level. And I've stuck my fingers in the free speech debate (about which I'm writing something longer, actually), and in the related due process debate (which may be all in my head). But in terms of good old-fashioned politics, there isn't much to say.

But Britain; oh, Britain. Are you guys watching this? From the absolute implosion of Gordon Brown's Labour government to the rise of Boris Johnson as London Mayor to David Cameron's perplexing brand of third-way conservatism, something special is going on in the UK. Each of those topics deserves its own post, and I'll try to do that this week. But if you've been wondering "hey, remember MaderBlog? I used to read that sometimes. I wonder what happened," the answer is, I'm still here, and I'm still reading. And I do hope to be back, in force, soon.

Classy

Hugo Chavez compares Angela Merkel to Hitler:

Mr Ch�vez described Mrs Merkel's conservative Christian Democratic Union party as �the same right wing that supported Hitler and fascism�. "Ms Chancellor, you can go to..." he said, before adding: "Because you are a lady, I won't say any more."

And what had Chancellor Merkel done to prompt this wise observation? She had the nerve to say:

"President Ch�vez does not speak for Latin America. Every country has its own voice, with which they pursue their own interests."

Cuba suffered more than thirty-two years under Fidel Castro; Zimbabwe still suffers in the twenty-first year of Robert Mugabe's presidency. Pray that Venezuela does not suffer under Chavez nearly that long.

Pray that Venezuela's neighbors don't either.

Can You Blame Them, Though?

After all, the speed with which Harper has moved from a Two-Nation Canada to a One-Nation Canada is enought to give anyone whiplash.

Is Two-Nation Canadianism inconsistent with Harper's invocation of Quebec's founding as the founding of Canada? Not necessarily. One might suggest, for instance, that the Quebecois are and always have been a separate and distinct people, but that their history and actions have contributed, directly, to the identity of the Canadian nation of which they are a constituent part. Maybe that's what Harper's up to.

But it sure doesn't sound that way, and that's sure not how it's being interpreted in LBP. Instead, Harper's remarks - and those of the Governor General - are being seen as an appropriation of the historical fact of the founding of Quebec on behalf of all Canadians, not just those of pur laine. In other words, Harper is not simply saying "this instant in Quebecois history led, in time, to the emergence of Canada, and therefore we celebrate this Quebecois moment for its importance to us." Instead, he's saying "this is a moment in Canadian history, and we celebrate it as such; not as a precursor, but as a genesis; not as a mere contribution to our national formation, but as its crucible."

This, it seems to me, is the fundamental claim of One-Nation Canadianism: that we are all the inheritors of all that has come before to make our nation what it is today; that we are all the descendants of Cartier and Champlain as much as Cabot and Hudson; that we are all the descendants of both Wolfe and Montcalme; and that therefore Quebec's history is our history, not the history of one constituent part of us that has merely contributed, in a historical sense, to our present.

Maybe you can square the circle; maybe Two-Nations Canadianism is a secular national version of the Holy Trinity. The Prime Minister doesn't seem to be going out of his way to argue as much, though; and the excitable Quebecois nationalists whom Wells highlights certainly don't seem to be finding much solace in the possibility.

So while I certainly celebrate the Prime Minister's newfound embrace of One Nation Canadianism, I repeat my first point: can you blame anyone for being surprised?

Israel

In the flood of op/eds and articles marking the sixtieth anniversary of the founding of the State of Israel, it was inevitable that some mainstream publication would publish something along the lines of this unapologetic ~~blood libel~~ by Jeet Heer [see below for clarification], although I'm a bit surprised it appears in the pages of the National Post. (Perhaps they've been so caught up in the recent free speech debate that they've forgotten that when the state abstains from policing private speech, it falls to us to express societal attitudes regarding what is and is not appropriate political discourse.) [EDIT: Kudos to the Post for doing just that, giving Heer's column credit where deserved but mincing no words in pointing out its flaws.]

In any case, if you need an antidote to Heer's tired and fatuous claptrap, I recommend Efraim Karsh's rather exhaustive, and rather more thoughtful, treatment of precisely the same issue in Commentary.

It is beyond debate that the entire existence of the Israeli state, from its creation down to the present, has been attended by unending tragedy. One of the greatest tragedies is the persistent unwillingness of the country's critics to separate the state's many true failings from the hysterical fantasies and conspiracy theories that essentially define modern anti-Zionism.

FURTHER THOUGHTS (18:41 EDT): Lest my post be seen as somewhat intemperate, let me expand. It is a matter of settled historical fact, insofar as such a thing ever exists, that during the period of Israeli independence - say roughly 1947-49 - many Arabs living in Palestine fled their homes while many more were killed by Jewish paramilitary groups. The debate, such as it is, is between (1) those like Heer who claim that (a) the Jewish leadership in Palestine desired, organized, and executed a deliberate program of ethnic cleansing, and (b) the subsequent killings and flight of Arabs from those parts of Palestine that later became Israel were a direct consequence of this Jewish program of ethnic cleansing; and (2) those like Karsh who claim that (a) no such program of ethnic cleansing ever existed, and (b) while some Arab deaths and flights were the result of Jewish paramilitary activity, many Arabs were killed by or fled at the explicit instruction of Arab leadership in Palestine in anticipation of the impending attack on Israel by its Arab neighbors.

Importantly, few, if any, serious Zionist historians deny the acts of a not-inconsiderable number of Jewish paramilitary groups that did in fact engage in the deliberate targeting of Arab civilians for the express purpose of removing parts of the Arab population from parts of British Mandatory Palestine. The disagreement, again, is over whether there was a movement-wide, organized program of removal of Arabs from parts of British Mandatory Palestine.

The historical record is there to be debated; I submit that at least as between Heer and Karsh, Karsh has the better argument. But recall the simple fact that in 1947, the United Nations voted to partition British Mandatory Palestine into two states, one Jewish, and one Arab; and recall that the Jewish political leadership in Palestine approved the partition plan, while the Arab political leadership in Palestine rejected the partition plan. Recall further that in response to the partition plan, and Jewish approval of it, the Jewish leadership subsequently declared the independence of the State of Israel - the anniversary we mark this week - on only that land apportioned to the Jewish state by the United Nations, while Arab leadership, in coordination with the governments of the neighboring Arab states, declared war on the fledgling Jewish state.

Recall these oft-overlooked facts and consider again which set of acts seems more consistent with a deliberate program of ethnic cleansing.

A PARTIAL RETRACTION: As MaderBlog readers would, I hope, agree, I generally strive for clarity and intellectual honesty in my writings - especially when I write on topics about which I have strong feeling. I've been thinking quite a bit about my characterization of Heer's piece as a blood libel, and on reflection I think I must retract that characterization.

A blood libel, classically defined, involves a false accusation of Jewish violence against non-Jews for supposed Jewish ends, where that accusation is made maliciously or with deliberate indifference to its truth or falsity. In this case I have no reason to believe that Heer has made his arguments regarding supposed Jewish ethnic cleansing of Palestinian Arabs either maliciously or with any deliberate indifference to the truth or falsity of those allegations. Accordingly, while I believe that the underlying accusation could easily constitute a blood libel - since it is an accusation of Jewish violence against non-Jews for supposed Jewish ends, which accusation is, in my opinion, completely unsupported by common sense or the historical record - I do not think it is fair to accuse Heer of perpetrating a blood libel in this instance.

About That Search

The Star reports:

At least some of the material that was carted or wheeled out Tuesday and Wednesday by RCMP officers assisting Elections Canada investigators was the basis for the party's planned questioning of elections officials in the lawsuit challenging their interpretation of campaign financing rules.

Included among papers and emails seized or downloaded were all of the party's documents, including a series of indexed binders of Elections Canada records, related to the Conservatives' challenge in Federal Court of the agency's decision to disallow rebate claims involving some local campaign advertising expenses in the 2006 election, according to a document obtained by the Star.

If this is true, it seems to me it means three things:

1. The Conservatives were at least partially correct when they alleged - to general condemnation - that the raid was motivated by the upcoming questioning of Elections Canada officials in connection to the Federal Court suit.

2. Stephen Taylor was absolutely right to question Elections Canada's exercise of its search power over the Conservative Party while the latter's suit against the former was pending in Federal Court.

3. By exercising their search power in connection with a civil suit to which they are a party, rather than in connection to an investigation into Elections Act violations, Elections Canada has engaged in a gross violation of the standards and spirit of procedural fairness, even if they haven't violated any law (of which I don't know enough to say). Parties to a civil suit have an established mechanism to obtain documents and information from their adversary: the process of discovery allows parties to request documents and requires the production of those documents, subject to established legal privileges. If a party believes its adversary is not producing legitimate discovery materials, the party can apply to the court for redress. But what Elections Canada appears to have done here is to invoke its own executive police power to seize, directly, documents - including, quite possibly, privileged documents (such as the work product of the party's lawyers) - that it did not obtain in discovery.

To understand why this is such an affront to procedure, consider the inverse: the Conservative Party surely has requested documents from Elections Canada in relation to its civil suit, and I'd wager that not all the requested documents have been produced. If the party believes those documents ought to be produced, their only recourse is to petition the court to compel production. They cannot - and they should not be able to - coopt the services of the RCMP and 'raid' the offices of Elections Canada to seize whatever documents they think relevant.

If the Star's story is accurate, we have more of a scandal on our hands than In & Out.

UPDATE [11:56 EDT]: Alright, it might only be a scandal for law nerds. But we're people too!

I Can't Be the Only One...

... who gets hungry at every mention of the In and Out scandal?

About That RCMP 'Raid'

I generally agree with Warren's point that it's bad cricket to badmouth the operations of our national police force (not that I've been immune from doing so). I also generally agree with Adam and Paul that, to the degree that their actions are seen as politically suspect, the RCMP is not entirely without fault.

All that being said, I think it's important to note that yesterday's 'raid' was not, in fact, part of a "police investigation." In fact, since we're all libel experts now, I should note that such a suggestion may be defamatory. Rather, the RCMP was merely executing a search warrant obtained by Elections Canada. I've been doing some research into certain Canadian administrative bodies recently - I hope to share the fruits of my research here soon - and one thing I've learned is that a rather surprising number of agencies enjoy the authority to search the property of private persons in furtherance of agency business. These searches must generally be authorized by a judicial warrant. When a judicial warrant is issued, the warrant must be executed by some police force.

So while it's very dramatic to see RCMP officers go rifling through Tory HQ, we should remember that, while there, these RCMP officers are not acting as investigating police officers. They're acting as the mere facilitators of a bureaucratic inquiry.

Important difference, I think.

UPDATE [11:51 EDT]: For context and background, here are the statutory provisions under which the search was conducted:

Canada Elections Act � 511(3):

For the purposes of section 487 of the Criminal Code, any person charged by the Commissioner with duties relating to the administration or enforcement of this Act is deemed to be a public officer.

Criminal Code of Canada � 487 (part):

(1) A justice who is satisfied by information on oath in Form 1 that there are reasonable grounds to believe that there is in a building, receptacle or place

(a) anything on or in respect of which any offence against this Act or any other Act of Parliament has been or is suspected to have been committed,

(b) anything that there are reasonable grounds to believe will afford evidence with respect to the commission of an offence, or will reveal the whereabouts of a person who is believed to have committed an offence, against this Act or any other Act of Parliament,

(c) anything that there are reasonable grounds to believe is intended to be used for the purpose of committing any offence against the person for which a person may be arrested without warrant, or

(c.1) any offence-related property,

may at any time issue a warrant authorizing a peace officer or a public officer who has been appointed or designated to administer or enforce a federal or provincial law and whose duties include the enforcement of this Act or any other Act of Parliament and who is named in the warrant

(d) to search the building, receptacle or place for any such thing and to seize it.

In fact, the plain language of the statutes suggests that Elections Canada officials wouldn't even need a police presence to enforce a warrant; investigating officials are deemed "public officers" and are authorized "to search . . . for any such thing and to seize it." That being the case, I do think it's legitimate to ask why the RCMP was there.

These statutes do touch on a larger issue, which Stephen addresses in part. Most people, I think, have a rather straightforward notion of how laws are made and administered: the legislature passes laws, the police investigate violations, the crown attorneys prosecute offenders, and the courts render verdicts and punishment. But a host of statutes in Canada have complicated that intuitive system. Now, the legislature passes a law outlawing certain conduct - and creating an administrative body to administer the law; one part of that body investigates violations; one part - often the same part - of that body prosecutes offenders; another part of that body renders a verdict and issues punishment; and only then, generally, is an offender given access to the courts of law.

In other words, a number of statutes - including the Elections Act, but also, increasingly notoriously, the various human rights acts and codes - eliminate the notional separation of executive and judicial functions. Agency officials become - not judge, jury, and executioner - but detective, prosecutor, judge, jury, and executioner.

That's a problem, for reasons we're seeing in the Macleans and Steyn cases, and for reasons I hope to elaborate on in the coming weeks.

UPDATE (13:53 EDT): A little more information:

Elections Canada spokesperson John Enright confirmed to the Star that Corbett sought the RCMP's assistance to execute a search warrant. . . .

RCMP commissioner Bill Elliott said the RCMP has a "longstanding memorandum of understanding" to assist Elections Canada, and insisted his officers were simply complying with a request.

I'd love to read that memorandum.

In Fairness to the Bloc

It's not something you can say about all the parties in Ottawa these days.

Before You Ask

Human Rights Commission complaints like this one are a useful way to expose ideologically motivated hypocrisy on the part of the human rights apparatus (for lack of a better term), but the complaint should still be opposed on the merits. I haven't read the book that forms the basis of the complaint, but judging by the characterization by the complainant, the Imam's comments - though racist, misogynist, and worthy of condemnation and contempt - should not be illegal.

Presumably my friend Warren disagrees.

Fun With Mr. Dion

Let's see if we can work this out:

Liberal Leader St�phane Dion is accusing the Conservatives of dangling vague and false hopes to Quebec with renewed talk of reopening the Constitution.

So the problem with the Harper/Blackburn proposal is that they don't mean it?

"He's confused. He's ambiguous. He has a hidden agenda. He must show it to Canadians. He must stop being secretive. He must be transparent about the fabric of this federation."

So the problem is that Harper does mean it, but isn't telling anyone that he means it?

Dion, a former minister in charge of the unity file and a constitutional academic before he came into politics, said the Prime Minister wants Quebecers to believe he'd recognize their nationhood within the Constitution, but in fact, has no plans to do so.

Wait - so does he have a hidden agenda or not?

Maybe it makes more sense in French.

In any case, isn't it a bit frustrating to see Dion, again, resorting to ad hominem rather than addressing the substance of the issue? This, recall, is the alleged academic whose rise to the leadership of the Liberal Party was greeted by many - myself included - as an opportunity to raise the level of political discourse and debate. And yet from day one Dion has seemed eager to eschew any academic or intellectual approach to the issues of the day in favor of hyper-partisan name calling. Early on he labeled the Harper government 'neo-conservative' without stopping to explain why that would be a bad thing. More recently he's derided the Conservative agenda as contrary to the interests of Canadians, while refusing to vote against that agenda. And now he's responded to an explicit challenge to Canadian unity - by attacking the Prime Minister's character.

Why can't he just say: This is a terrible idea? Why can't he say: All the ten provinces are partners in confederation, all are equal, all stand together under one flag? Why can't he say: The Quebecois experience, stretching back four hundred years, involving triumph and tragedy, celebration and defeat, but all the while perseverance, tenacity, joie-de-vivre - the Quebecois experience is part of what it is to be Canadian?

Why can't he say that? Because he'd lose votes in Quebec? This guy? This darling son of la belle province? This electoral behemoth? Why can't this purported leader respond to some obvious pandering with clarity and vision and purpose - unless he's engaged in precisely the same sort of pandering?

A lot of Conservatives are perfectly happy to see Dion remain Liberal leader, secure in the knowledge that the longer he's in his office, the longer they're in theirs. But all governments require an effective opposition - especially when they seek to tinker with the foundation of the body politic. I don't actually think Blackburn's comments are a harbinger of coming constitutional change; I think they're pretty clearly just another example of underperformance by the Tory front bench. But even these sorts of off-the-cuff comments deserve a swift, strong, smart response. Surely someone in Ottawa has to stand for a one-nation Canada. You'd think that person would be Mr. Unity, the constitutional academic.

But he's clearly not up to the job.

On Mill On the Harm Principle

An interesting review of a recent biography of John Stuart Mill explores changing conceptions of harm:

Mill had a view of men as capable and energetic, who, when given the chance, could progress to become serious and even �heroic� individuals. Thus, he had a quite narrow view of harm: in his view, it would take quite a lot to harm individuals who were possessed of free will and very often grit, and therefore he argued that only clear cases of harm could justify restrictions.

Today, by contrast, individuals are viewed as weak and vulnerable. The term �the vulnerable� is used to refer to whole swathes of society. We are considered to be easily damaged and fragile creatures who must be mollycoddled by political leaders, social workers and health practitioners in order to keep our self-esteem intact. So almost everything is seen as �harmful� to us today. The difference between Mill�s view of harm and the popular view of harm today is the difference between a view of mankind as generally good and capable of freedom, and a view of mankind as weak and degraded. So where Mill emphasised the necessity of liberty, today many officials and commentators talk about the �dangers of unadulterated liberty�.

Interesting, particularly in light of the ongoing debate over free speech in Canada.